Despite a large body of research in the management, accounting, economics, and finance literatures, the relationship between board composition and firm performance is still controversial and ripe for debate (for a recent study, see Boone et al., 2004) . Utilizing the theoretical approach of Zahra and Pearce (1989) that identifies the three key roles of the board as oversight, strategy, and service, we examine the effects of having board interlocks between an industrial firm and of financial services firm, and firm characteristics. Using publicly available data on all listed Italian firms for the year 2001, we find that for industrial firms, there is a positive relationship between the number of board interlocks with a bank and current year return on assets, however, the opposite is true for financial services firms. Finally, we find no relationship between interlocking directorates with banks and firm capital structure.
Introduction
Optimal board composition has been a matter of debate for the past thirty years. Despite a large body of research in the management, accounting, economics, and finance literatures, the relationship between board composition and firm performance is still controversial and ripe for debate (for a recent study, see Boone et al., 2004) . Since corporate governance is central to the efficient functioning of capital markets, the need to understand the structure and composition of the board of directors creates a fruitful avenue for research. According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983 ) the board performs two main functions: oversight and setting CEO pay. Other theories such as stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Muth and Donaldson, 1998 ) emphasize the strategic function of boards, and resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) views boards as boundary spanners. To this date, none of those theoretical perspectives has received definitive empirical validation. The relationship between board characteristics and firm performance remains a controversial topic in financial markets, regulatory bodies, and academic research: Studies have found either no results or contradictory findings when examining the relationship between board composition and firm performance (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Chaganti et al., 1985; Daily and Dalton, 1992 Dalton et al., 1998; Ezzamel and Watson, 1993; Kesner et al., 1986; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Peng, 2004; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Schellenger et al., 1989) . Hence, at least in academic circles, the superiority of any theoretical approach as well as its empirical validity is unclear (Raheja, 2004; Boone et al., 2004; Linck et al., 2005) .
Utilizing the theoretical approach of Zahra and Pearce (1989) that identifies the three key roles of the board as oversight, strategy, and service, we examine the relationship between interlocking directorates (when board of director members of one firm are also board members on another firm) and firm performance. Our study is motivated partly by the desire to contribute to the governanceperformance debate and partly to understand how corporate governance facilitates relationships between banks and industrial firms. We specifically examine the effects of having board interlocks between an industrial firm and a bank (financial services firm), and we hypothesize the following:
Industrial firms having board interlocks with banks have higher levels of debt financing due to the resource-picking effect provided by interlocking with a bank. Additionally, we also hypothesize that interlocks between industrial firms and financial institutions provide synergistic benefits for both entities: Firms are able to obtain cheaper financing, improving their financial position, and banks are better able to monitor firms and reduce information asymmetries. Therefore, we expect interlocks between banks and industrial firms to have a positive performance effect for both entities. Using publicly available data on more than 200 Italian firms, we use a multivariate OLS regression model to test these relationships. Results indicate that for industrial firms, there is a positive relationship between the number of board interlocks with a bank and current year return on assets, indicating that both the monitoring effect of banks and a facilitated access to capital have a positive effect on firm performance. However, for banks, there is a marginally negative relationship between the number of board interlocks with an industrial firm and return on equity. This surprising result indicates that industrial firms use their connections to banks to extract rents to the detriment of the financial institutions. Finally, we find no relationship between the number of interlocks between industrial firms and banks and industrial firms' capital structure.
This paper contributes to the existing debate regarding corporate governance and firm performance. We find that board interlocks have differential effects on performance predicated upon the specific nature of the interlocking relationship. This study also adds to the literature examining relationships between industrial firms and financial institutions in general, and specifically, board interlock as a means to such relationships. Finally, we also provide an analysis of the role of banks in the underdeveloped Italian capital markets for which we collect data on all publicly available firms in CONSOB (the Italian SEC). This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework and presents the hypotheses; Section 3 discusses the specific institutional background of Italy. Section 4 discusses the sample selection and variables used, and Section 5 presents the results followed by the discussion and conclusion.
Theoretical Framework

The Board of Directors: Roles and Composition
Modern governance theories have three primary assumptions regarding the board of directors. First, each director within the board has an individual function of providing skills, knowledge, expertise, and connections to the external environment.
Second, the board of directors performs different tasks simultaneously. Third, the board of directors performs tasks according to the strategic alternatives facing the company (Rindova, 1999) . Consequently, there is a large variability as to what each individual member can contribute to the firm (Sullivan, 1990 ). This board diversity combined with what the executive team contributes in terms of decisionmaking abilities produces a "mosaic" of management approaches to strategic choices (Markarian and Parbonetti, 2005) .
In order to further understand the board of director and its composition as well as its effect on firm decision making, we have to re-examine the underlying theories regarding board functions. Extant systems have adopted the agency theory influence view that boards have a binary composition of being independent or entrenched because most policy research has looked at boards in terms size, power structure, and independence. Such a view of the firm is useful if we are analyzing the board in terms of its monitoring activity, but since the board concurrently performs control, strategic, and service functions (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) , modern views of governance need to examine boards in an organic, rather than a binary, perspective. In this study, we examine the relationship between board composition and firm characteristics, such as performance and capital structure, from the perspective that each board member brings different capabilities to the firm. While previous research has examined the relationship between board structure and firm characteristics, we argue that each director within the board contributes to the firm in terms of the specific capabilities and resources that he or she can contribute. Therefore, the firm's performance and strategic choices with respect to the firm's internal and external environments are affected by the contribution of each board member (see Branson, 2003; Gillan et al., 2003; Hillman et al., 2000; Lehn et al., 2004; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) .
In the theoretical development advanced by Zahra and Pearce (1989) , which assimilates the agency, resource-based, and legalistic perspectives of corporate governance, the structure and composition of the board of directors represent a function of the firm's external (industry, competitive environment, legal) and internal (life cycle, CEO style, size, resources) contingencies whereby boards perform three basic functions: service, strategy, and oversight (control). Strategic decision making has been identified as a primary role of board members (Bavly, 1985; Estes, 1980; Kreiken, 1985; Harrison, 1987; Rosenstein, l987; Schmidt and Bauer, 2006; Tashakori and Boulton, 1985; Waldo, 1985; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) . The oversight function relates to monitoring managers and protecting shareholders (Carpenter, 1988; Chapin, 1986; Ewing, 1979; Linck et al., 2005; Louden, 1982; Mattar and Ball, 1985; Mueller, 1979; Vance, 1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) . Finally, the service role relates to strengthening the ties with the external environment, enhancing strategic bonds with key entities (Carpenter, 1988; Leibowitz, 1978; Louden, 1982; Swaminathan and Moorman, 2003; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Vance, 1983) . Based on the three roles performed by board members, the next sections examine the role played by directors who are board members of a firm and a bank at the same time: the service and oversight functions of board members in monitoring of lending relationships (Booth and Deli, 1999 ).
Bank-Firm Relationships and the Strategic/Service Function
As discussed in Section 2.1, board functions are affected by the contributions of individual board members. Therefore, the skills, expertise, and resources contributed by each board member affect the firm's strategic decision making. One such characteristic is whether a board member in an industrial firm is also a board member in a firm in the banking industry. A board member from the banking industry would provide different resources to the firm as compared to those of a politician, a scientist, or an executive from a competing firm. For example, if the host firm is a relatively small technologically intensive firm, board members who are university scientists can provide resources regarding the latest advances in the technology domain; board members who are politicians can provide the necessary connections to reduce the cost of business in the firm's geographic location. Finally, a board member from the banking industry provides resources regarding the firm's capital structure and could provide cheaper access to financing.
Academic and anecdotal evidence suggests the strategic and service functions are among the most important roles of board members (see Johnson et al., 1996; Jennings and Lumpkin, 1992 Vance, 1978) . The service function involves environmental scanning to provide the necessary information regarding the external environment (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985) and helps firms assess characteristics of strategic issues (Jackson and Dutton, 1988) . The service role enhances company reputation and facilitates important strategic connections, reducing the costs of doing business. As for the strategic function, Andrews (1980) argues that board members participate in the strategic decision-making process because they possess the necessary requisite judgment and because it improves their oversight function. The strategic management literature has identified two processes for acquiring competitive advantages: resource picking and capability building (Makadok, 2001 ). The resource-picking process enhances a firm's ability to obtain resources and information from the environment. A competitive advantage will exist if the resource is obtained at a price lower than that available in an independent arm's-length transaction. One way to enhance resource picking is to have interlocking directorates (Burt, 1983; Pennings, 1980) , 1993) . When it comes to bank-firm relationships, the presence of bank representatives on the board of directors enhances the resource-picking process. Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that boards of directors act as boundary spanners. Boards of directors are vehicles through which firms absorb important external resources (Pfeffer, 1972) . Kesner (1988: 68) argues that "outsiders often help an organization secure scarce resources through external associations." Pfeffer (1972) finds a positive correlation between the proportion of directors that represents financial institutions and leverage and interprets such a relation to be coherent with the idea that banks would provide capital when they have representation on the board of directors. A different interpretation of Pfeffer's (1972) finding is that the connections between banks and firms can reduce the cost of borrowing thanks to a better information flow between the banks and the firms (James, 1987) . As reported by Mace (1971: 132) , bankers believe that board membership formalizes the relationship between their banks and industrial companies. Booth and Deli (1999) provide empirical evidence that support the notion that outside directors from the banking industry provide debt market expertise, while Hoshi et al. (1991) document the potential benefits that arise form the connections between banks and firms. They analyze Japanese firms that are members of keiretsus and compare them with Japanese firms that are not. They find that keiretsu firms have higher debt levels than nonkeiretsu firms and that investment is less sensitive to liquidity in keiretsu firms than for independent firms. These findings suggest that firms that are inherently bound in business relationships with banking entities have an easier access to capital and that a larger part of their financing is done through their close ties with debt providers. In this study, we examine the expertise related to debt markets and its effect on firm capital structure by investigating the potential benefits of interlocking directorships in providing debt market expertise. This strategic/service role consists of (1) the provision of necessary connections as well as information and the ability to access capital through connection with the banking industry and (2) the ability to evaluate alternative debt contracts and pricing arrangement. If board members belonging to the banking sector sit on industrial firms' boards and provide the firms with the necessary financial resources, then we expect the following:
H1: The number of interlocking directorates that a firm has with banks positively affects the amount of debt financing.
Bank-Firm Relationships and the Monitoring Function
In Section 2.2, we argued that the presence of interlocking directorates with banks affects the firm's capital structure and financing decisions. In this section, we examine whether such a relationship affects the performance of both the firm and the lending institution. As advanced by agency theory and assumed in current governance trends, boards that have a majority of independent directors adequately monitor top management (Dedman, 2002; Hopt and Leyens, 2004; Johnson et al., 1996; Klein, 2002) . Board independence has been associated with a reduced likelihood of financial misstatement (Dechow et al., 1996) , a more comprehensive audit (Carcello et al., 2002) , and lower levels of earnings management (Klein, 2002) . In general, independent directors preserve shareholder interests by using their expertise to enhance the comprehension, creativity, and soundness of a firm's decisions (Ginsberg, 1994; Rindova 1999 ). These relationships pertain to board independence per se; however, they do not address the type of board members occupying seats on the board.
In a bank-firm relationship setting, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find results that are consistent with the notion that outside directors contribute in a monitoring function. They examine the market response to the appointment of a board member with a financial background and find that there is a positive abnormal return associated with such an appointment, indicating that the market perceives that such appointments are in shareholder interests. Pfeffer (1972) finds that the connections between banks and firms can reduce the cost of borrowing thanks to a better information flow between the banks and the firms (James, 1987) . Hoski et al. (1991) suggest that the close ties occurring within the keiretsu benefit the firms because banks have the incentive to monitor the firms, thus reducing information problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984 ) and incentive problems (Myers, 1977) . Hoski et al.
(1991) also find that close bank ties reduce the cost of financial distress, and Gilson et al. (1990) find that financially distressed firms with higher leverage are more likely to reorganize outside of bankruptcy courts. These findings combined suggest that closer ties to banks provide easier and cheaper access to capital, increase monitoring, and reduce the likelihood of distress, thereby positively affecting the firm's performance.
An interlocking directorate facilitates the relationships between a bank and a firm when representatives from the banking industry are independent members of the board of directors of industrial firms, have access to inside information, and simultaneously provide executives the necessary resources to access capital. Additionally, interlocking directorates may also have indirect consequences because they may serve as a certification form signalling the creditworthiness of the firm, thus helping firms secure cheap capital from other banks or investors (Fama, 1985; Kracaw and Zenner, 1998) . In sum, so long as firms need capital for growth and survival, there is a positive expectation from having lenders on the board of directors (Booth and Deli, 1999) , which leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: The number of interlocking directorates with banks positively affects firms' performance.
Sharing one (or more) directors with a firm permits the financial institution to access proprietary information. Links between firms and lending institutions could reduce contracting costs as do the links within a keiretsu (Booth and Deli, 1999) . Interlocking directorates that occur between firms and banks permit firms to economize on the cost of monitoring as a result of greater access to information (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Williamson, 1988) . This easy flow of information improves a bank's evaluation of the creditworthiness of the firm, facilitating the lending process (Kracaw and Zenner, 1998; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001) . As a consequence, we argue that close ties between banks and firms provide benefits not only to the firm but also to the bank, leading to our third hypothesis: H3: The number of interlocking directorates with firms positively affects banks' performance.
Institutional Background: Corporate Governance in Italy
The Italian system of corporate governance is characterized by an underdeveloped capital market and weak legal protection of small shareholders (La Porta et. al., 1999). Companies, even though public, typically belong to a pyramidal group structure where the "top" group generally controls a number of subsidiaries (Brioschi et. al., 1990) . Such hierarchical groups control over 56 percent of firms in the manufacturing industry in excess of 200 employees (Bianco et al., 1996) . In general, such ownership structures offer ample opportunities for expropriating small shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 1999) when there is a marked separation of control rights from cash flow rights by means of a pyramidal group and cross-ownership ties. Furthermore, Zingales (1994) These characteristics make the Italian corporate governance system more similar to the German and Japanese system than to the U.K./U.S. (so called Anglo-Saxon) governance model (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Italy differs from the German and Japanese systems, however, because banks' monitoring activities seem to be ineffective. Brunello et al. (2003) raise concern about the ability of banks to monitor insiders. Thus, coupled with a weak external market for corporate control, there seems to be inadequate monitoring of insiders on behalf of minority shareholders. The Italian financial system relies on multiple loans from the same lending institution, but unlike German banks, Italian banks are legally prohibited from voting the shares that are in their custody (Franks and Mayer, 1998) . Thus, Italian banks are at a relative disadvantage when it comes to monitoring firms.
In sum, because of weak legal shareholder protection and ownership concentrated at the top of a pyramidal ownership structure, the Italian capital markets provide for a fruitful setting to examine relationships between banks and industrial firms through board interlocks. This study of a "locked" capitalism dominated by a few families and shareholders renders interlocking directorates between banks and firms as the only way through which banks exert their oversight role over insiders.
Data and Variables Used
Data
Our sample consists of all companies listed at the Milan Stock Exchange in the year 2002. We use data available through CONSOB that disclose the composition of the board of directors. We classify each firm as an industrial firm or a financial services firm based on the SIC classification, and we classify as an interlock each board member concurrently holding board membership in an industrial firm and in a financial firm. As such, each firm might have multiple interlocks depending on the number of ties held by each board member. Financial data are computed using data from the annual report. The final sample consists of 204 industrial firms and 50 financial services firms.
Variable Used
For the purposes of our study, we utilize as our main research variable INTERLOCK, which is a measure of the extent of interlocking relationships between an industrial firm and a financial services firm. Furthermore, in order to examine the relations between interlocking directorates and debt policy and between interlocking directorates and performance, we also calculate the debt ratio (DEBTRATIO) as long-term debt as a percentage of total capital [LTD / (LTD + Equity)] (Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005). Booth and Deli (1999) document that although the association between bankers on the board and bank debt may be strong, the association with nonbank debt may be insignificant. Thus, our measure of aggregate debt maybe be conservatively biased (see Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005) . Firm performance is measured using return on asset (ROA), and bank performance is measured using return on equity (ROE). This distinction is due to the difficulties in defining the operating profit of a financial institution. To isolate the relationships between our variables of interest, we also utilize a number of firm-specific variables. First, we control for firm size using the number of employees (EMPLOYEE).
1 Second, consistent with previous studies, we control for the firm's growth opportunities using the market to book value of equity ratio, MBV (see Booth and Deli, 1999; Smith and Watts, 1992) . Third, we consider two governance variables that may represent the monitoring of insiders: the incidence of CEO with the chairmanship role (CHCEO) and the size of the board of directors (NBOD) (see Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988) . For a list of variables used in the study, please see Table 1 . [See appendices, Table 1 ]. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics. Upon examining them, we can make the following key observations regarding industrial firms: On average firms have 0.88 links with banks, and the maximum number of interlocks that a firm has with a bank is 11. 39.7 percent of firms with at least one interlock with a bank, and 18 percent of firms with more than a single interlock. Analyzing the 500 largest U.S. manufacturing firms, Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) find that the board of 37 percent of all firms has at least one banker, although Booth and Deli (1999) find that 43 percent of S&P 500 firms have at least one member representing the financial services industry. Hence, in our data, Italian firms appear to have stronger ties to the financial services industry than do U.S. firms. Looking at firms in the financial service industry, we see that on average banks have 4.82 interlocks with industrial firms, and the maximum number of interlocks that a bank has with an industrial firms is 25. 77.1 percent of banks with at least one interlock, while 60 percent of banks have more than one interlock with an industrial entity. Banks on average have boards made up of 15.44 members, while the board of industrials has on average 9.0 members. Similar to our results, Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) and Booth and Deli (1999) document an average board size of 12.0 members. Finally, banks on average are larger than the industrial firms as evidenced by the fact that they have twice as many employees, consistent with the fact that Italy has underdeveloped capital markets that are dominated by financial institutions. [See appendices, Table 2 ]. Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. Panel A, which examines industrial companies, indicates that the number of interlocks that a firm has with banks depends on both the size of the firm and the board but is negatively correlated with CEO duality and positively related to performance. Contrary to expectations, the debt ratio and the number of interlocks are not correlated. As robustness check, we also calculate the correlation coefficient between the debt ratio and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the case a firm has at least one or more interlocks with a bank (0 otherwise). Our results do not change in this alternate specification; hence, for parsimony, we do not report them in this and following tables.
Results
Descriptives and Univariate Analysis
If the ties between firms and banks serve in supplying debt-market expertise and monitoring lending relationships, then we expect that the number of interlocks between firms and banks to be positively related to a firm's use of debt. However, these results are at the univariate level, and tests in the following section will examine these relationships at the multivariate level, taking into consideration firm specific effects. Panel B of Table  3 reports correlation coefficients regarding banks. Its results show that the number of interlocks that a bank has with firms is not correlated with the research and control variables. [See appendices, Table 3 ].
Multivariate Analysis
The univariate analysis provides useful insight on the relationship between interlocking directorates and firm debt policy as well as firm performance. However, these univariate tests could be misleading because they fail to account for potential correlations among the independent variables. Therefore, in this section, we utilize an OLS regression model to examine our hypothesized relationships. Table 4 shows results examining our first hypothesis: The number of board interlocks between an industrial firm and a bank positively affects the total debt held by the firm. Results on INTERLOCK are insignificant, indicating that in our sample firms there is no relationship between board interlock with financial services firms and capital structure. The size of the firm is significantly and positively related to leverage because EMPLOYEE is positive (t-value = 2.165), signifying that larger firms have more debt, which is consistent with larger and more stable firms being able to attract debt financing. We see that the size of the board is not related to the firm's capital structure. In general, larger firms have both larger boards and more debt financing; hence, the inclusion of firm size in our regressions renders the relationship between board size and leverage insignificant. Finally, the coefficient on MBV is positive and significant, indicating that when we control for size, firms with higher growth opportunities are able to secure debt financing. [See appendices, Table 4 ]. Table 5 presents results examining our second hypothesis regarding the relationship between interlocking directorates and firm performance. We see that INTERLOCK is positively and significantly related to ROA; this result is significant, controlling for the size of the firm, the size of the board of directors, the power of the CEO, and the firm's growth opportunities. We see from the four control variables that only MBV is significant and that the negative relationship signifies that for firms with larger growth opportunities, profitability is lower, perhaps because such firms hold the promise of future profitability. We see that the adjusted Rsquared of 22.6 percent provides the reasonable explanatory power of our regression model. [See appendices, Table 5 ]. Table 6 reports the results of our third hypothesis. We see that INTERLOCK is negatively related to ROE, indicating that for banks that have a large amount of interlock, there is a negative relationship with respect to profitability. However, this relationship is only marginally significant (p < 0.10). We also see that CHCEO is negatively related to ROE, indicating that for firms whose power is concentrated in the hands of the CEO, inadequate monitoring results in lower profitability. MBV is significantly positive, indicating that for Italian banks with growth prospects, profitability is relatively higher. The R-squared of 13.4 percent again indicates that the regression is of reasonable explanatory power. [See appendices, Table 6 ].
Discussion and Conclusion
Our empirical tests examine three hypotheses in which we find that the number of interlocks between an industrial firm and a financial service firm benefits the former to the detriment of the latter. We also find that such directorates are not related to the amount of debt carried by the industrial firm. The following discussion attempts to explain and reconcile our results with those of other studies in the literature that examine relationships between firms and banks. Kaplan and Minton (1994) argue that there are differential relationships between firms and banks depending on the institutional structure of the firm; in their analysis of poorly performing Japanese firms, they find that bankers are added for monitoring purposes, but this is not the case for U.S. firms. Gilson (1990) argues that during financial distress, bankers are added to the board in a monitoring capacity although Booth and Deli (1999) argue that bankers on boards do not monitor debt owned by firms. In sum, the studies just cited have contradictory findings regarding the role of bankers in monitoring firm debt. This could explain our results on H1 and H3: Positions on firm boards do not facilitate the lending process, and information asymmetries do not appear to be reduced. Also, such positions do not seem to be increasing the amount of total debt held by the firm. If anything, these results indicate that close relationships between banks and firms are detrimental to the firm. A similar argument can be found in La Porta et al. (2001) and Laeven (2001) , who examine Russian and Mexican banks before their financial collapse and find that poor lending practices involving closely affiliated firms represented one of the factors leading to poor performance. These papers that examine the unique institutional environment of Russia and Mexico are relevant to understand the relationships between Italian firms and lending institutions. A possible explanation of our results is that firms interlock with banks in order to extract rents, not to obtain debtmarket expertise. For firms based in a country characterized by weak legal protection of investors and a small capital market, interlocks with banks may represent a way to permit firms to acquire capital.
Taking into consideration the history of the Italian banking system and the governance model could provide some insights to our findings. At the beginning of the 1990s, all major Italian banks were owned by the government. During the privatization wave of the 1990s, all major industrial groups tried to establish close ties with banks in order to have an easy access to capital. Specifically, having a link to a bank allowed a firm to obtain its capital needs without constraints. Since Italian equity markets are insignificant, establishing ties with banks could represent an important benefit for firms. Since banks possibly decide on their investments by considering the needs of the industrial group instead of their portfolio of strategic opportunities, this could potentially explain banks' negative performance with respect to interlocking directorates. It is a widely accepted anecdote that pyramidal groups are able to obtain cheap financing from affiliated lending institutions. This is evidenced by the recent scandals at Parmalat and Cirio, which involved Italian banks as co-conspirators. These scandals highlighted the negative effect of the links between banks and firms on the banks. Although bank involvement led to the eventual revival of Parmalat, this action was not without huge financial costs borne by the affiliated lending institutions. Finally, the more recent scandal involving the past governor of the Bank of Italy, Antonio Fazio, highlighted the presence of a little known network of insurance companies and financial institutions. Alternatively, our differential results regarding interlocks on firms and banks could be interpreted as follows: Directors of successful firms are invited to sit on other boards; consequently, a large number of directors of successful industrial firms sit on the boards of poorly performing banks. Another remote possibility is the fact that board members of banks having multiple directorates are busy directors who are not able to monitor the banks properly. Also, contrary to previous empirical studies (Booth and Dely, 1999; Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) , our analysis does not confirm the hypothesis that interlocks between banks and firms serve to supply firms with debt-market expertise and debt financing. These differences with previous studies could be due to the fact that previous studies consider interlocks that occur by means of a bank's executive (CEO, CFO, etc.), while we consider all possible interlocks, therefore diluting the power of our proxy, which is a limitation of our study. Another limitation of our study is that we analyze only a single year of data because the hand collection and classification of data was a tedious process. To strengthen our tests, we must examine a longer time series of data as a way to validate our current findings. This is the first study that examines interlocking directorates in Italy in a unique setting of weak capital markets where the relationships between banks and firms are paramount to the survival and growth needs of firms. Our results as a whole have a number of interesting implications, including the fact that strong ties between industrial and financial firms in Italy have positive effects on the firms because of the monitoring effect of bankers and their provision of business expertise. However, this relationship is apparently at the detriment of banks, possibly due to the extraction of cheaper, or riskier, financing. Our findings have important implications to regulators and academics not only in Italy but also to regulators, academics, governance consultants, and politicians interested in understanding the role of banks and corporate governance in underdeveloped capital markets. 
